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Indian Manufacturing 
Productivity: What Caused 





This article addresses the question of why productivity growth in Indian manufacturing was
slow in the pre-reform period and analyzes how economic reforms in the 1990s accelerated
productivity growth. The answer lies in two subtle but important distortion-inefficiency
mechanisms, which affected productivity growth by distorting intermediate input allocation.
The interaction of quantitative restriction policies and inflexible labour laws resulted in lower
than optimal materials per worker usage. The combination of high inflation and unavailability
of credit exacerbated this factor distortion and lowered productivity growth further. Using a
panel dataset on Indian industries, this article finds widespread underutilization of materials
compared to labour until recently, and this sub-optimal materials per worker usage lowered
productivity growth.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article cherche à déterminer pourquoi la croissance de la productivité dans la fabrication
en Inde a été lente dans la période préalable à la réforme et il analyse comment les réformes
économiques des années 90 ont accéléré la croissance de la productivité. La réponse tient à
deux mécanismes subtils mais importants de manque d'efficacité et d'effet de distorsion, qui
ont eu des répercussions sur la croissance de la productivité en créant un effet de distorsion
sur la répartition des intrants intermédiaires. L'interaction entre les politiques de restrictions
quantitatives et les lois rigides sur la main-d'œuvre ont entraîné une utilisation inférieure au
niveau optimal des matériaux par travailleur. L'inflation élevée et la non-disponibilité du
crédit ont ensemble exacerbé cet effet de distorsion des facteurs et ont fait diminuer
davantage la croissance de la productivité. Au moyen d'un ensemble de données recueillies au
moyen de panels sur les industries indiennes, on constate une sous-utilisation généralisée des
matériaux comparativement à la main-d'œuvre jusqu'à récemment, et cette utilisation sous-
optimale des matériaux par travailleur a fait diminuer la croissance de la productivité.
THE SLOW PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH in Indian man-
ufacturing before the late 1990s is cited as one of
the major reasons why the Indian economy could
not achieve high rates of economic growth. Indian
manufacturing productivity growth was slower
compared to that in other Asian economies like
China and Vietnam, as shown in Fernandes and
Pakes (2008). But more interestingly, the relative
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performance of the manufacturing sector in India
was poor compared to the Indian services sector.
Chart 1 shows output and output shares of manu-
facturing and services in India for 1960-2002.
Manufacturing output grew during these 42
years, but that growth was slower than the
growth in services output, which starts
growing exponentially in the 1990s. The
contrast between these two sectors becomes
clearer when looking at their shares of total
output. The share of services jumped from
0.29 in 1960 to 0.50 in 2002, while the
share of manufacturing went from 0.11 to
0.18 in 2002.
Why is it that under a similar economic
environment the service sector grew at
remarkable rates while the manufacturing
sector did not? How did reforms in the 1990s
spur productivity growth in the manufactur-
ing sector? This article differs from previ-
ous articles2 in its approach to answering
these questions by introducing two new fac-
tors. First, the role of intermediate inputs is
examined, as this is missing from the dis-
cussion despite being the most important
difference between manufacturing and ser-
vices production processes. Second, this
article studies the effects arising from the
combination and interaction of policies,
which can be totally different from the indi-
vidual effects of policies. Adding these two
dimensions provides new insights into the
Indian economic growth experience.
By taking this appraoach, this article finds that
the difference between the growth performance of
the manufacturing and the service sector is caused
by the greater reliance of the former on intermedi-
ate inputs. Interactions and combinations of poli-
cies (inflexible labour laws in the presence of a
quota-permit system) and economic conditions
(high inflation in the presence of credit unavail-
ability) in India created distortions resulting in
production inefficiency. These mechanisms ham-
pered productivity growth in manufacturing by
forcing firms to operate at non-optimal intermedi-
ate input allocation. Economic reforms in the
1990s helped reduce these distortions by removing
many of these restrictions and, as a result, the
mechanisms that caused inefficiency disappeared.
This article discusses the economic mechanisms
through which government policies affected man-
ufacturing productivity at the firm level. 
To estimate the effect of a given policy, one
needs to isolate it from other policies. But the cet-
2 See Basu and Maertens (2007) for a survey of some of the explanations for economic growth in India after the
reforms.
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eris paribus assumption comes at a cost, because
the interaction of different economic conditions
may give rise to mechanisms or incentives that are
totally different from the predicted outcomes of
any single policy. This is especially true in the case
of India, where different policies are not always
coordinated or synchronized. Rajan et al (2006)
argue that the development policies adopted after
India’s independence can be described as “idio-
syncratic”. In fact, the reason manufacturing
growth is relatively slower lies in the way the
Indian economy has evolved. By the time indus-
trial growth started to become the focus of five-
year plans, India had already embraced the social-
ist model of planning. Government regulations and
control greatly influenced Indian industry through
the notorious “license-raj” (the quota-permit sys-
tem) and rigid labour laws. Besley and Burgess
(2004) show that pro-worker industrial dispute
regulation tend to lower output, investment, pro-
ductivity and employment in manufacturing.
Fernandes and Pakes (2008) also find that labour is
underutilized in states with more restrictive labour
laws (e.g. an amendment to the Industrial Disputes
Act which made the firing of workers illegal
except with previous permission from the appro-
priate state government). 
Why do these worker-friendly labour laws end
up reducing productivity and inducing the
underutilization of labour? This article shows that
it is because of the presence of the additional (and
often ignored) policy of a quota system. The inter-
action of the quota system with existing conditions
and labour laws created economic mechanisms
that distorted the usage of intermediate inputs,
which are very important in manufacturing pro-
duction (a share of 60 per cent of gross output).
This non-optimal allocation of intermediate inputs
resulted in inefficiencies in the manufacturing sec-
tor.
Unfortunately, the effect of the quota-permit
system on Indian industry has not received its due
attention. Mohammad and Whalley (1984) discuss
some of those licenses and other controls. Their
estimates of the welfare losses from rent seeking in
India are as high as 30-45 per cent of GNP. The
main sources of rent seeking were price controls
and rationing. Das (2004) finds that the structure of
import licensing remained restrictive and compli-
cated throughout the 1980s and even in the early
1990s. In general, labour laws have not changed
dramatically and economic reforms have focused
on removing these license regulations rather than
labour rigidities. This indicates that the observed
improvements in productivity performance stem
mostly from the removal of the quota-permit sys-
tem and the reason for differences in pre-reform
and post-reform performance is directly related to
this quota system. 
This article argues that the combination of the
two distortions caused by labour-rigidity and the
materials-quota were impeding productivity
growth. An optimizing firm has to equate its labour
and material ratio such that marginal returns are
equal to the respective prices. But if a firm cannot
fire extra workers due to the labour laws, it ends up
requiring more material to reach its optimal alloca-
tion. However, the firm cannot buy extra materials
because of quota-permit restrictions. Hence, the
firm ends up operating at non-optimal levels. In
isolation, none of these policies would have
resulted in a distorted allocation. 
This mechanism also explains the result
observed by Chand and Sen (2002) that the liberal-
ization of intermediate-good sectors is better for
TFP growth than the liberalization of final-good
sectors.
This article also provides another perspective on
the role of inflation in affecting growth in Indian
manufacturing. Inflation combined with credit
unavailability forced firms to operate at non-opti-
mal input allocation because they could neither
reduce labour (due to labour laws) nor afford to
buy materials (due to credit constraints and signif-
icant increase in materials prices due to inflation).
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materials inflation and real wages (labour produc-
tivity) indicating the presence of this channel. 
These results provide new perspectives for poli-
cymakers regarding two widely used industrial
policies: labour market regulations and import
substitution regimes. Ahsan and Pages (2007) find
that in India pro-worker labour policies are associ-
ated with reduced productivity growth. Kruger
(1997) discusses how it was thought that import
substitution in manufactures would be the key to
development. Earlier explanations about both
these observations, i.e. labour laws slowing
growth and import substitution policies slowing
growth, are based on calculating implicit costs or
wasted resources. This article finds a direct chan-
nel (intermediate inputs) and the distortion mecha-
nisms through which productivity is affected. 
One of the major impacts of economic reforms
in India was to break these interactions by removal
of permit quotas and by increasing credit availabil-
ity. The distortion-inefficiency mechanisms
described above no longer remain relevant because
the firms are not restricted when choosing their
material input allocation (layoff restrictions have
still not been removed). This article finds that the
distortions in input allocation and their effect on
productivity growth fell significantly after the
reforms in the 1990s. It also shows that firms have
started over-substituting materials relative to
labour. This explains the phenomenon of jobless
growth in Indian manufacturing. The firms are pro-
ducing more output because of this material-deep-
ening, but they are avoiding hiring additional
workers to avoid future inflexibilities and legal
issues. Like many other studies, these findings call
for the policy makers to take another look at the
existing labour market regulations in India. 
Industrial Economic Policies 
in India before 1991
The industrial sector became the focus and one
of the early goals of the Indian government’s five-
year plans. Just like every other part of the econ-
omy, Indian manufacturing has experienced an
evolution of policies in the last three decades. It
has been the subject of many productivity and pol-
icy research studies, but often for the wrong rea-
sons. Unlike other sectors in India and unlike
manufacturing sectors in other developing coun-
tries, the manufacturing sector in India did not reg-
ister many years of consistent high growth until
very recently. GDP (at 1993-94 prices) in manu-
facturing grew almost 10 times between 1960 and
2002. But the unimpressive labour productivity
and TFP growth estimates from various studies
have portrayed Indian manufacturing as a stagnant
sector that is little affected by the early stages of
policy reform. Das (2004) finds the TFP growth
over the period of 1980-2000 to be negative and
attributes this to structural factors.
Inflexible Labour Laws
The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 states that
the “discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termi-
nation” of an individual workman by an employer
“shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute''. This
law has motivated many studies on the role of
labour market regulation in India. Labour regula-
tion has become a standard part of the explanations
for India's poor growth performance before the
1990s. Besley and Burgess (2004) show that
Indian states which made additional amendments
to this act in favour of workers experienced lower
output and productivity in manufacturing. They
also find that pro-worker labour regulation is asso-
ciated with increases in urban poverty. Fernandes
and Pakes (2008) use World Bank Investment Cli-
mate Survey data to show that conditional on firm
productivity, factor costs and other factors faced
by firms, labour was underutilized in Indian manu-
facturing in 2001 and 2004. The supposed explana-
tion is that these inflexible labour laws restricting
the firing of workers in India resulted in firms low-
ering their demand for labour. Ahsan and Pages
(2007) discuss various types of labour laws in
India, including Chapter V(b) of the amendment toINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 89
the Industrial Disputes Act which prohibits firms
that employ 100 or more workers from retrenching
without permission from the state. There are
around 45 pieces of central legislation covering
various aspects of employment as well as a large
number of state laws. Even shifting the weekly
schedules or days offs without notice could be in
non-compliance to the labour legislation. Ahsan
and Pages (2007) find that regulations that impede
employment adjustment are associated with nega-
tive effects on output.
Quantitative Restrictions:
Import Permit Quota
Jagdish Bhagwati (1978) examined in detail the
quantitative restrictions which were the building
blocks of industrial policy in India. These were
guided by the principle of import substitution and
were justified by the aim of protecting domestic
producers. Commodities were divided into various
categories and producers needed to apply for spe-
cific licenses for items not under open general
license (OGL). Licenses were required for produc-
ing new products or expanding production capaci-
ties. Mohammad and Whalley (1984) estimate that
the cost of these rent seeking policies in India was
as high as 30-45 per cent of GNP and it “put India
in a different category altogether” in terms of the
extent of distortions. 
Despite being one of the most widely criticized
policy choices, not many studies have tried to iden-
tify and estimate how this quota system affected
the growth in Indian manufacturing. Bhagwati and
Desai (1970) document the industrial licensing
scheme adopted in India after the passage of the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of
1951. There were several separate license catego-
ries. A capital goods (CG) license was required to
import necessary capital goods, while actual user
(AU) licenses, issued to producers for imports of
raw materials and intermediate goods, had items
specified in considerable detail to ensure that only
the approved production would be made feasible.
This also required that value and/or quantity limits
were specified for the listed importables on each
license. These licenses even specified the compo-
sition and the source of the goods and were non-
transferable between firms and even between
plants within a firm. This licensing system was
inefficient since it lacked any evaluation criteria
and there were large administrative costs and
delays.
Other Economic Conditions: 
High Inflation and Low Credit 
Availability
Inflation has been consistently high in India.
Annual average CPI inflation has been 8.2 per cent
per year between 1970 and 2003. The pre-1990s
and post-1990s inflation rate averages were 8.6 per
cent and 7.4 per cent respectively, both much
higher than average inflation in industrialized and
newly industrialized countries. In China, the aver-
age retail price inflation between 1978 and 2003
was around 5 per cent. Intermediate input prices
have also experienced the same kind of high infla-
tion throughout the last three decades. The average
annual inflation rate of materials prices was 7.5 per
cent.
Using industry specific price index data from
India’s Central Statistical Organization, we calcu-
late average inflation rates for output in all 58
industries. The average inflation is higher than 7
per cent per year for 53 industries, with a few
industries experiencing price increases averaging
more than 11 per cent per year between 1973 and
2003. During this period, the annual nominal wage
inflation in Indian manufacturing was 9.6 per cent;
11.1 per cent per year before 1990 and 7.1 per cent
per year after 1990.
It was the currency crisis of 1991 in India that
paved the way for a broad set of reforms including
capital market reforms. Prior to that, credit mar-
kets in India were unorganized and underdevel-
oped. Chart 2 shows the lending rates of various
countries using data from the IMF’s International90 NUMBER 20, FALL 2010 
Financial Statistics. For India, lending rates were
16.5 per cent for the entire decade of the 1980s.
They were not only higher than in developed coun-
tries such as United States and Germany, but also
higher than other Asian economies like Singapore
and Malaysia. Interest rates, which denotes the
cost of borrowing, remained very high in India
until late 1990s. Capital markets were also under-
developed. Table 1 shows stock market capitaliza-
tion in 1990 for different countries. For India,
market capitalization as percentage of GDP was
much lower than for other countries.
Role of Intermediate Inputs 
in Manufacturing Growth
To see the role of the materials-per-worker ratio
in output growth in manufacturing, let us consider
a simple extension of Solow's growth accounting
model by including materials as an input in the
constant return to scale production function. 
(1)
where Y stands for output, K for capital, L for
labour, A is a measure of the production technol-
ogy and other unobservable inputs, α is the capital
share in output and β is the materials share in out-
put.
This can be rearranged in per-worker terms as
 (2)
where k stands for capital per worker and m is 
materials per worker.
Hence labour productivity growth between two
periods can be expressed as following.
(3)
Hence, labour productivity growth is the sum of
TFP growth and the contributions of capital per
worker growth and materials per worker growth.
The last term in Equation 3 denotes materials-
deepening, which receives little attention in the lit-
erature, even though it can be of crucial impor-
tance in explaining output growth of the
manufacturing sector. The estimated values of
input shares for Indian manufacturing are 




























Market Cap. / GDP 
(per cent)
Value Traded / GDP 
(per cent)
India 38.6 12.2 6.9
Malaysia 48.6 110.4 24.7
Korea 110.6 43.8 30.1
Singapore 34.3 93.6 55.4
Hong Kong 83.4 111.5 46.3
Germany 355.1 22.2 21.4
United States 3,059.4 53.3 30.5
Chart 2
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is very important for the gross output of the Indian
manufacturing sector.
Value-added (VA), which is widely used as the
output measure in industry-wide analysis, is
obtained by subtracting the real intermediate
inputs (M) from real gross output (Y). 
(4)
or in per-worked terms,
(5)
where va stands for value added per worker, and
m is materials-per-worker.
Hence the labour productivity growth (using
value-added) is given by 
(6)
The above equation contradicts the notion that
value added productivity growth is independent of
materials used. A change in the materials-per-
worker ratio between two time-periods affects
labour productivity growth even if the output is
measured using a value-added concept. In fact,
some methodologies try to highlight the impor-
tance of intermediate inputs, e.g. Domar weights
and terms-of-trade decomposition. But the general
consensus is that if we are measuring the output as
value added, we do not have to worry about the
intermediate inputs. As shown in Equation 6, this
is clearly a simplification, as it assumes that the
materials-per-worker ratio remains constant
between periods. 
The importance of raw materials has not been
studied widely in the Indian manufacturing pro-
ductivity literature. The reason is that ideally this
materials input should have been allocated to
equate the returns between the materials and
labour; and hence value-added productivity
growth should have been independent of the mate-
rials input. But this has not been the case with
Indian manufacturing. Government policy, or to be
more specific the interaction of government poli-
cies, distorted the materials input allocation com-
pared to the labour input and this had a negative
effect on productivity growth. This article defines
and estimates some measures of this distortion by
comparing the observed materials-per-worker
ratio to the (hypothetical) optimal materials-per-
worker ratio for the given materials’ prices and
wage levels. 
Input Distortions and Productivity  
The presence of channels that transfer the effect
of policy interactions (labour laws in the presence
of quantitative restrictions) and economic condi-
tions (high inflation with low credit access) to the
production process in Indian manufacturing can be
verified using the data. From production function
estimates, one can identify whether the value of
materials-per-worker is higher than or lower than
the optimal  . A lower   means the firm is
either operating with less than the desired materi-
als input (due to a quota) or with more than opti-
mum number of workers (since the firms cannot
lay-off workers). 
We can see how these distortion-inefficiency
channels work in different scenarios by consider-
ing a simple production model Y = F (A, K, L, M);
where output Y is produced using capital K, labour
L and materials M. A is the measure of production
technology and other unobservable inputs. The
optimization gives the following first order condi-
tions for input allocation in terms of price of labour
w and price of materials PM. 
 (7)
For the Cobb-Douglas production function, this
condition can be written as
(8)
In response to a positive technology shock, there
is upward pressure on wages due to increased pro-
ductivity. Since imported materials prices (PM) are
determined in the world market, the optimality can
only be achieved by either using more materials or
using less labour. In India, however, the quantita-
tive restrictions do not allow a firm to use more
materials, and the inflexible labour laws prohibit a
VA Y M VA AK
αM
βL
1 α – β – () M – = ≡ – =
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firm from using fewer workers. As a result, the
optimal materials-per-worker ratio is not achieved.
Due to these frictions, the gains from technological
progress are not fully realized and firms are forced
to operate at non-optimal factor allocations.  
The distortion worsens in the presence of rising
prices and limited access to credit markets. Let us
consider the effect of high inflation in materials on
the factor allocation choice of a firm. In absence of
credit, the firms may find it difficult to buy the
same amount of materials as in the last period due
to increased prices. The firm can still operate effi-
ciently by shrinking its scale and reducing labour
input according to its budget. But even that is not
possible. Since it is difficult to layoff workers, the
firms have to compromise on materials and must
operate at a lower materials per worker ratio than
in the last period. This causes the output to go
down and hence reduces productivity growth.
Substitutability between Materials 
and Labour: An Example 
One of the main differences between manufac-
turing industries and services industries is that
manufacturing primarily changes the physical
characteristics of a good. Unlike the substitutabil-
ity between capital and labour, materials and
labour have limited substituability in manufactur-
ing. The increased capital input in the form of
machinery makes some of the workers redundant.
But one cannot use labour input in place of the
materials that are required to create the final out-
put. Materials and labour inputs are still substitut-
able in the sense that firms can outsource some of
the process of converting to the final good. Rather
than producing some intermediate materials them-
selves, they might directly buy it from other firms.
For most of the manufacturing industries, how-
ever, the actual production function of their final
output is Leontief in terms of the intermediate
materials requirements. 
Let us consider the example of a car manufac-
turer. The final good, a car, is made by combining
different intermediate goods like engines, airbags,
and tires. The production function would be 
(10)
 where,  = Scale of Production
 = Maximum number of Cars that
could be made using M.
The function N(M) has the following Leontief
form:
N(M) = min (engines, , steering wheel,
brake pedal,  , ...) (11)
This materials upper-bound function N(M) is
not relevant in cases where the material input is not
the limiting factor and hence only the scale S(K,L)
matters. In these cases, the concept of value-added
by capital and labour can explain the output growth
correctly. But in the case of India, N(M) had an
upper bound due to import quota restrictions.
Indian manufacturing firms could have reduced
their scales S(K,L) accordingly, but labour laws
made that difficult.  
Table 2 provides a simple example of how these
restrictions would harm a typical car manufacturer
by denying it the benefit of technological
advances. Note that even after the reforms the
manufacturer is not reaching the growth potential.
The firms are not hiring more workers even when
it is optimal to do so, because they are worried
about firing restrictions and extra costs.
Productivity Estimation 
Methodology
The estimates used in this article are based on
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data version
2 released by the Economic and Political Weekly
Research Foundation. 
The Annual Survey of Industries is the principal
source of industrial statistics in India. It provides
data on various vital aspects of registered factories
such as employment, wages, invested capital, cap-
ital formation, inputs, gross output, depreciation
(9)
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and value added, etc. It covers all factories regis-
tered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Facto-
ries Act, 1948 i.e. those factories employing 10 or
more workers using power, and those employing
20 or more workers without using power. The
dataset is created from these surveys and has 31
variables for the years from 1973 to 2003. The arti-
cle uses both aggregate level data and industry
level data for 58 industries based on the 3-digit
national industry classification (NIC) code. 
Industry-specific price deflators are taken from
the wholesale price index series provided by
India’s Central Statistical Organization (CSO).
GDP, GDCF deflators and interest rate series were
available from the Reserve Bank of India publica-
tion titled Handbook of Statistics of the Indian
Economy.
Real value added is calculated using double-
deflation. Gross output is deflated using sector-
specific price indexes, materials inputs are
deflated using the wholesale price index for manu-
facturing and fuels are deflated using the fuel and
energy price index available from CSO. The busi-
ness services input is estimated by subtracting the
sum of materials and fuel from the total value of
inputs. This business services input is deflated
using the consumer price index. The capital input
is generated using the user-cost approach. 
This article estimates the unit-input require-
ment, which is the amount of each factor that is
required to produce one unit of output in each year.
It also estimates the productivity growth measures
based on an index number method which has the
advantage of incorporating the effect of changes in
factor shares. A Fisher index is used for aggregat-
ing the input quantities. TFP growth is estimated as
the ratio of output growth and input quantity index
growth. For gross output all three inputs (capital,
labour and materials) are used, while for value
added only capital and labour inputs are used. 
(12)
The above set of estimates are calculated for all-
industries data (time period 1970-2003) and for
panel dataset using 3-digit National Industrial
Classification (NIC) codes (time period 1973-
2003).
Estimating Distortions 
There have been few studies which estimate the
extent of distortions in factor allocation. Hsieh and
Klenow (2007) quantify this factor misallocation
by comparing marginal products of labour and cap-
ital in industries in India and China with those in
the United States. Fernandes and Pakes (2008)
estimate the underutilization of labour and capital
across states for Indian manufacturing in 2001.
This article uses a similar concept, but rather than
estimating absolute values, it measures the distor-
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Table 2
Productivity Growth in Indian Manufacturing – An Example 
  
Scenario Optimal Response L & M Restrictions 
(Pre-Reform)
Only L Restrictions 
(Post-Reform)
Baseline L-Prod. = 1 Car/Worker.
L ¦ = 100 Workers. 
M = 100 Engines. 400 Tires. 




L-Prod. = 1.2 Cars/Worker.
L ? (depending on wage
increase and labour supply,
assume 110).
M = 132 Engines. 528 Tires.
Y = 132 Cars.
Y Growth = 32%.
 = 100 Engines. 400 Tires.
(fixed due to permit quota)
L ´ (no incentive to increase
the workers) 
Y = 100 Cars.
L-Prod. = 1 Car/Worker.
Y Growth = 0%
L ´ (still many disincentives
to increase the workers) 
M = 120 Engines. 480 Tires.
Y = 120 Cars. 
L-Prod. = 1.2 Cars/Worker.
Y Growth = 20%.
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tions (under- or overutilization) relative to the
other factors. 
We believe this is a superior approach. If one
tries to measure the misallocation or underutiliza-
tion of factors by the amount of extra labour that
will be required to justify the wages, one is assum-
ing that capital is already optimally allocated,
which defeats the purpose of this counter-factual
exercise. Measuring the relative distortions does
not depend on these assumptions and, as shown
earlier for a Cobb-Douglas specification, this
ratio-based relative underutilization measure is
directly related to productivity growth. 
Another problem with earlier approaches is the
implicit assumption that TFP estimates represent
the unit-production-values, i.e. if one amount of
each input is employed, the output will be equal to
the value of estimated TFP for that period. This is
hard to justify since there are measurement errors
and many of the unmeasured inputs such as educa-
tion and economic conditions are also included in
the TFP estimates. Therefore, it makes more sense
to base the analysis on TFP growth, as is done in
this article, rather than on the absolute values of
TFP estimates. 
Using ASI data, the production function for
Indian manufacturing is estimated using Olley-
Pakes and Levinshon-Petrin methodologies on the
panel dataset. These methods give robust estimates
for the labour, capital and material shares. The
optimal   and   ratios are calculated using
the estimated factor shares and observed factor
prices in the corresponding periods. These are
obtained by making the ratios of marginal returns
on the factors equal to their relative prices. The
estimated underutilization is the difference
between this optimal ratio and the actual ratio of
inputs used in that period. 
Underutilization = Optimal   (Prices) – Actual
(13)
Similarly, the optimal relative substitution val-
ues are calculated using observed changes in factor
prices and factor allocations between two time-
periods. The under-substitution is the difference
between the optimal and the actual changes of rel-
ative factor allocations.
Under-Substitution = Optimal   ( Prices) –
Actual (14)
Underutilization of Materials 
and Productivity Growth in 
Indian Manufacturing
Using data for all-industries, Chart 3 plots the
movement of the actual versus the optimal 
ratio. Compared to 2003, the actual materials-per-
worker index is lower than what the optimal should
have been for the existing wages and materials'
prices in each year. We find that for the entire
period (1970-2003) materials were on average 25
per cent underutilized compared to labour and this
average is reduced by half (i.e. 12 percentage
points) after the reforms in the 1990s. When esti-
mating the underutilization of materials with a 3-
digit NIC code panel dataset, the unweighted aver-
age underutilization of   over 58 industries is
almost the same as the all-industries average (24
per cent for the 1973-2003 period and 11 per cent
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Similarly, the estimates show that compared to
labour, capital input is being over-utilized in the
later periods. These results are similar to those of
Fernandes and Pakes (2008), who found overuti-
lization of capital in 2001 and 2004. This overuti-
lization happened because capital prices dropped
significantly after 1990s and Indian manufacturing
firms started over-substituting capital relative to
labour. One explanation for this trend might be the
fact that the reforms did not change the labour
laws. A firm still needs to obtain government
approval to layoff workers and such approval is
rarely given. Expecting these issues, firms prefer
not to hire the workers and over-substitute other
factors (capital and materials) compared to what is
optimal at the existing prices. This leads to the
observed overutilization of capital.
This article finds that some industries (specified
by their 3-digit NIC code) are over-substituting the
materials input relative to labour input. This
observed presence of over-substitution of materials
relative to labour in the 1970s and 1980s does not
imply that few firms somehow got around the
licensing requirements. It simply means that even
when wages went down (relative to materials prices)
the firms did not hire more workers. The firms might
have done this for two reasons. Their input factor
allocation was already distorted and materials were
underutilized, so the firms did not want to increase
this distortion. Another reason might be that these
forward-looking firms knew that in the future they
would not be able to obtain the extra materials
required to make these workers more productive and
neither would they be able to fire these workers if
relative prices change again. Thus, they chose not to
hire extra workers even when it was optimal to do so
at the existing prices. 
The estimated average of over-substitution of
materials relative to labour for all-industries is
around 3.6 per cent per year. But this varies by
period, with the average being 0.7 per cent in the
1970s and 7.2 per cent between 1996 and 2003. For
the years after the reforms, this over-substitution
of materials relative to labour is continuously
increasing despite the fact that the materials are no
longer underutilized relative to labour. This trend
indicates that producers are unwilling to hire work-
ers due to labour market inflexibilities and firing
costs, which should be a concern for Indian policy-
makers. 
The period averages of estimated growth rates
are shown in Table 3. We can see that firms have
been continuously increasing their materials usage
much faster than their labour input usage. This
Table 3
Growth Rates in Indian Manufacturing by Period




70 – 80  80 – 90 90 – 97 97 – 03
Gross Output 6.0 6.4 6.6 7.0 3.2
Labour 1.1 3.6 0.4 2.7 -3.7
Capital 3.6 3.8 4.4 8.7 -3.9
Materials 6.5 4.8 8.8 6.9 5.4
Value-Added 4.4 6.4 4.1 4.7 0.9
Using Gross-Output
Labour Productivity 4.9 2.8 6.2 4.3 6.9
TFP 1.3 2.4 2.2 -0.8 2.8
Using Value-Added
Labour Productivity 3.2 3.0 3.6 1.9 4.3
TFP 2.3 4.6 4.2 -2.2 4.8
Chart 4
Change in Productivity Growth between 1981-90 and 1990-
2000 by Average Materials-Gross Output Ratio for 3-Digit 
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results in increased labour productivity growth,
averaging 6.2 per cent per year for the 1980-90
sub-period and 6.9 per cent for 1997-2003 as the
firms try to move towards an optimal materials-
per-worker allocation. 
The estimates in Table 3 show that the immedi-
ate impact of the reforms was negative, as both
labour productivity growth and TFP growth
slowed down in the 1990-97 period. But if we look
at the jump in labour and capital imput growth dur-
ing these years, the estimates make sense. Since
the industrial reforms coincided with the opening
of capital markets in 1991, Indian manufacturing
units started expanding due to easier access to cap-
ital irrespective of their productivity. But once
capital markets developed and competition from
foreign firms increased, the resources started flow-
ing from inefficient units and industries to more
efficient ones (this reallocation is sometimes
called churning). The government disinvestment
initiative also helped in this process. The result
was a 3.2 per cent annual average growth in gross
output between 1997 and 2003, despite using less
capital stock and fewer workers.
To verify whether the abolition of industrial
licensing helped to remove these distortions, this
article estimates the industry-wide average pro-
ductivity growth in the years preceding and fol-
lowing the reforms. Chart 4 presents the results
based on a 3-digit industrial panel data according
to the average materials to gross output (nominal)
ratio for manufacturing. The industries using more
materials should have faced higher distortions and
hence should have benefitted more from the
removal of the restrictions. The scatter-plot in
Chart 5 confirms this. It shows the increase in 10-
year average annual productivity growth rates
between post and pre reform periods (i.e. 1990 to
2000, and 1981 to 1990) is higher for industries
that use materials more heavily.
In the Indian manufacturing sector, the interac-
tion of the quota permit system and labour laws led
to sub-optimal materials-per-worker usage and
thus slowed down labour productivity growth.
This mechanism is identified by finding the corre-
lation between underutilization and productivity
growth. Similarly, the combination of high infla-
tion in materials and less developed credit markets
reduced the intermediate input usage in response to
price increases, which in turn resulted in lower
labour productivity. This second mechanism is
recognized by looking at the relationship of mate-
rials inflation with productivity and real wages.
This article estimates these two channels using
aggregate data (all-industries) and panel data con-
sisting of 58 industries based on 3-digit NIC code.
The summary of the main relationships for the
Chart 5
Material-per-Labour Growth and TFP Growth in 
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panel data is shown in Table 4 and Table 5; and the
estimates are plotted in Chart 5. 
For both panel and aggregate data, underutiliza-
tion of materials is negatively correlated to labour
productivity levels and growth. More interest-
ingly, the underutilization of ( ) is also nega-
tively related to TFP growth. The labour
productivity relation is simply an implication of
distorted input allocations. But it is not obvious
why TFP growth should be affected by materials
and labour usage. One explanation can be that this
underutilization gives rise to other inefficiencies
as well. For example, to work with less material
input per worker, the production process needs to
be reorganized and machines run fewer hours per
week. This change in schedule can cause disrup-
tion and lower productivity. 
The distortion measures (underutilization and
under-substitution) are negatively related to TFP
growth because of the nature of the Indian govern-
ment’s policies. Labour is bounded by below and
material input has an upper bound. Since ( ) is
lower than the optimal at existing prices, any








Distortions and Productivity Correlations, 1970-2003, 3-Digit NIC Code Panel 
 
Productivity Measure (Y) Distortion Measure (X) Corr. Co-Var. Pooled OLS β
Lab. Prod. (GO) Under-Util. M/L -0.69 -0.29 -0.99***
Over-Util. K/L 0.6 0.29 0.74***
Lab. Prod. (Val-Add) Under-Util. M/L -0.26 -0.15 -0.5***
Over-Util. K/L 0.29 0.19 0.46***
∆ Lab. Prod. (GO) Under-Subs. M/L -0.42 -0.33 -0.5***
Over-Subs. K/L 0.18 0.2 0.21*
∆ Lab. Prod. (Val-Add) Under-Subs. M/L -0.3 -0.28 -0.34***
Over-Subs. K/L 0.21 0.25 0.36***
∆ TFP (GO) Under-Util. M/L -0.31 -0.27 -0.37***
Over-Util. K/L 0.2 0.13 0.23
∆ TFP (Val-Add) Under-Subs. M/L -0.26 -0.21 -0.35**
Over-Subs. K/L 0.17 0.13 0.19
*10% significance level ** 5% significance level *** 1% significance level
Table 5
Factor Inputs, Prices and Productivity, 1970-2003, 3-Digit NIC Code Panel 
 
Productivity Measure (Y) Input/Price Measures (X) Pooled OLS β
Real Wage Inflation Materials Inflation -5.91***
-8.6*** (73-90)
0.003 (91-03)
∆ Lab. Prod. (GO) Materials Inflation -0.32***
∆ Lab. Prod. (Val-Add) Materials Inflation -0.39
Lab. Prod. (Val-Add) L Growth, M Growth -0.39***, 0.11**
∆ Lab. Prod. (GO) L Growth, M Growth -0.46***, 0.33***
-0.73***, 0.7*** (91-03)
∆ Lab. Prod. (Val-Add) L Growth, M Growth -0.34***, 0.18***
-0.43***, 0.48*** (91-03)
∆ TFP (GO) L Growth, M Growth -0.22***, 0.2*** (91-03)
∆ TFP (Val-Add) L Growth, M Growth -0.23***, 0.12***
-0.31***, 0.38*** (91-03)
*10% significance level ** 5% significance level *** 1% significance level98 NUMBER 20, FALL 2010 
going to increase the inefficiencies. That is why
labour growth is negatively related to TFP growth
and materials growth is positively related to TFP
growth. 
Labour productivity measured in value-added
terms is negatively related to labour growth due to
decreasing marginal product. The estimates show
that even value-added labour productivity is posi-
tively related to materials growth. This highlights
the importance of material input for the manufac-
turing sector performance. The reason for this
finding is the widespread underutilization in mate-
rials in Indian manufacturing resulting from the
presence of restrictive industrial policies. An
increase in the growth rate of materials helps to
reduce this distortion and enables workers to
increase their value-added. 
The estimates show that the measures of produc-
tivity growth are negatively related to under-sub-
stitution of materials relative to labour and
positively related to growth in materials usage.
These results support the presence of distortion-
inefficiency channels operating through the inter-
action of policies. The under-substitution leads to
the worsening of input distortion, and hence using
less material inputs per worker, resulting in lower
productivity growth. An increase in materials
usage helps to bring the input allocation closer to
optimal and increases productivity growth. This
article also finds that intermediate input (materi-
als) price inflation is negatively related to real
wage growth. This negative correlation occurs
because in the absence of credit availability, the
rising materials prices mean fewer materials per
worker and thus reduced labour productivity. This
lower labour productivity means a drop in real
wages. The overutilization of capital relative to
labour has a positive correlation with labour pro-
ductivity, which is the usual capital-deepening
effect. 
Role of Economic Reforms
India's current phase of economic reforms began
in 1991 when the government faced an exception-
ally severe balance-of-payments crisis. The Con-
gress government at the time started short-term
stabilization processes followed by longer-term
comprehensive structural reforms. In 1991, the
government of India adopted the New Industrial
Policy. It abolished industrial licensing for almost
all industries, irrespective of the levels of invest-
ment. This industrial policy was supported by
trade policy that removed import restrictions and
liberalized foreing direct investment as part of the
multi-faceted gradual reform process. Ahluwalia
(2002) outlines and evaluates these sets of struc-
tural reforms. India’s reform program also
included wide-ranging reforms in the banking sys-
tem and capital markets relatively early in the pro-
cess, with reforms in insurance introduced at a
later stage. 
These reforms broke down two major links that
were responsible for distorted input usage and
lower productivity growth. The removal of quanti-
tative restrictions meant that firms were no longer
forced to operate at a sub-optimal level. Firms still
cannot reduce the number of workers, but they can
increase the intermediate inputs usage (and capital
usage) and make the allocation optimal for given
prices. Similarly, improved credit access meant
that firms could reach this optimal allocation even
in periods of high inflation. Firms can borrow
money, use the optimal inputs and repay the loan
after selling the output (because higher intermedi-
ate input prices usually mean that output prices are
also higher). 
The estimated growth rates and relationships
among them in Tables 3 and 4 clearly show the
positive impact of the reforms. After the reforms,
materials growth averaged around 7 per cent per
year between 1991 and 2003 for all-industries. The
effect of materials growth on labour productivity
growth and TFP growth amplified after 1991. The
pooled OLS coefficient between materials growthINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 99
and labour productivity growth is 0.7 for the sub-
sample 1991-2003, more than double the value for
the entire time period of 1970-2003. The increase
in coefficient value implies that materials growth
is becoming more important in labour productivity
growth. 
Chart 6
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As mentioned earlier, some of the estimation
results run contrary to the conventional wisdom
which suggests that growth in net value added
should not depend on materials at all. This article
finds that labour productivity growth and TFP
growth measured in value added terms are strongly
correlated with growth in materials usage. This
relationship becomes stronger after the reforms
(pooled OLS coefficient is 0.48 for subsample of
1991-2003 compared to 0.18 for the entire time
period). The relationship between intermediate
input inflation and real wages breaks down after
the reforms. The coefficient is close to zero and no
longer significant after 1991. The explanation is
that the inflation-productivity mechanism was
being driven by low credit availability. Reforms
increased the credit availability by liberalizing
capital markets.
Another important consequence of the economic
reforms was that one of the restrictions that only
applied to the manufacturing industry was
removed. The import quota and industrial licens-
ing policies abolished during the reforms were
more relevant to the manufacturing sector than the
service sector. In recent years, the growth rates of
the manufacturing sector have been higher than the
service sector growth rates; this was something
very uncommon in the years before the reforms. 
Did Import Quotas Lead to 
Underutilization and 
Bottlenecks?  
The quantity restrictions were only applicable to
imported goods. But there were no controls on
buying intermediate inputs from within the coun-
try. It will be prudent to make a distinction
between imported and domestic materials input
and then re-do the whole analysis. The underuti-
lization and its negative effect on Indian manufac-
turing productivity should exist only for imported
materials. Unfortunately, the ASI dataset does not
have the split between domestic and imported
materials. 
We can look at two different trends which indi-
cate that the imported intermediate inputs were the
real bottlenecks in Indian manufacturing. The
actual production process of many manufacturing
industries can be characterized as a Leontief spec-
ification, where production involves transforming
the input. In such industries, output - and thus
labour productivity - becomes restricted by the
least freely available input. In the presence of an
import permit-quota system, the least freely avail-
able inputs were imported intermediate goods.
If imported inputs were the bottlenecks, the
removal of these restrictions would lead to an
increase in demand for these inputs without corre-
sponding increase in the other inputs. That is
exactly what happened in Indian manufacturing.
As shown in Table 3, the materials input grew at
the average annual rate of 6.9 per cent and 5.4 per
cent for the 1990-97 and 1997-2003 periods
respectively. The corresponding average growth
rate for labour input were 2.7 per cent and -3.7 per
cent. Chart 6 shows the growth in imported raw
materials and intermediate inputs. There is a dis-
tinct jump after the reforms. The growth rates of all
the imported items other than coal increased sig-
Chart 7
Input/Output Ratios in Registered Indian, Manufacturing, 
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nificantly. Indian manufacturing firms that were
previously forced to operate at less than optimal
( ) ratio due to quota restrictions started moving
towards their potential productivity by importing
and using more intermediate inputs.
The continuous increase in the material content
of output, as shown in Chart 7, indicates that
Indian manufacturing is becoming more special-
ized or high-end. But the production of (low value)
intermediate goods is not being outsourced to the
unorganized manufacturing sector in India, as both
output share and output growth rates of the unorga-
nized manufacturing sector have declined in the
years after the reforms (Chart 8). 
This reaffirms the belief that only the imported
intermediate-inputs were the bottlenecks. The
Indian manufacturing firms were not restricted in
their access to raw materials and intermediate-
inputs that were domestically available. But these
goods were not perfect substitutes for the quota-
restricted imported intermediate inputs. The pro-
duction functions of manufacturing firms (e.g.
chemical, semi-conductors, electronics, and spe-
cialized goods) often have Leontief type comple-
mentarities between intermediate inputs and
labour input. The restrictions on these goods cre-
ated a bottleneck that choked the productivity
growth in Indian manufacturing. 
In fact, the concurrent trends of the increase in
the growth rates of imported intermediate goods
and the decrease in the growth rates of unorganized
manufacturing output are consistent with the
mechanisms discussed. Since there were no
restrictions on buying domestically produced raw
materials, which were often bought by the unorga-
nized manufacturing sector, the reforms had no
direct effect on these firms. But the firms in the
organized sector, which were previously using the
(imperfect) substitutes produced domestically by
the unorganized sector, started reducing their reli-
ance on these domestic goods after the reforms and
started importing the desired intermediate inputs.
This is why the output growth rate of the unorga-
nized sector fell in the late 1990s. 
Conclusion
This article has shown how the import permit-
quota system in the presence of inflexible labour
laws resulted in input distortions in Indian manu-
facturing that had negative effects on productivity
growth. The role of intermediate inputs in the man-
ufacturing sector deserves greater attention, espe-
cially for developing countries. Even though the
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India, labour laws are still unchanged. Indian man-
ufacturing firms are shying away from hiring
workers, which is not socially desirable. India has
a huge pool of unskilled workers and the need to
move them out of the unproductive agricultural
sector is becoming more urgent. Policymakers
should reconsider these labour laws in view of the
fact that they are hindering employment growth
and leading to jobless output growth in Indian
manufacturing. 
The evidence of the mechanisms identified in
this article would be more robust if the data on
imported and domestic materials input were
included in the analysis. In the absence of such
data, one could try to rank the industries based on
their imported input requirements and then see
whether the effects are more severe in the indus-
tries that use a larger share of imported materials.
Another important dimension in analyzing the
results is the production function complementari-
ties between materials and labour. We should see
more prominent results in industries which have
Leontief type production processes.
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